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1 Introduction
In the period June 3-13, 2004, the Danish Customs and Tax carried out a
series of control operations vis-a-vis a number of rms in several service sec-
tors.1 Most actions involved pizzerias, restaurants, and taxi companies, but
a whole range of service sectors was covered. Tax evasion proved to be per-
vasive. For instance, among 678 pizzerias and restaurants inspected, 40 pct.
had messed-up accounts, i.e., incomplete registration of earnings. Further,
of 1,846 employees in these rms, more than half were not registered, and
of these no less than a third claimed to have their rst working day in
the rm, this being the reason for lacking registration of their employment.
Later raids by the tax authorities conrm that under-reporting of income of
workers is a wide-spread phenomenon in many service sectors, and a testi-
mony of the importance of under-reporting is that the Ministry of Taxation
in Denmark has made so-called Fair Play, i.e. truthful reporting of income
earned and wages paid in all sectors, a top priority.
Under-reporting of income is of course not only a Danish phenomenon,
but a problem for tax systems in all countries. For the tax evaders involved,
under-reporting can have dire consequences. When rms refraining from
paying social security taxes and from withholding income tax on behalf of
their employees are detected, then the taxes due have to be paid, and on top
of this both employer and employee can be ned or even imprisoned.
On a wider scale, the scope for under-reporting of income and the prob-
ability of being detected are likely to inuence the working of labor markets
and in particular the level of wages and the rate of unemployment. Firms
and workers may agree to report only part of the remuneration of labor as
o¢ cial wage, paying the remainder of the remuneration as an uno¢ cial and
unreported wage component. Thereby, they save on social security taxes
and personal income taxes, but face the risk of being detected with resulting
nes.
This paper aims to shed light on the link between opportunities for under-
1Description of the control operations and of the sanctions associated with di¤erent
forms of tax evasion is available at www.skat.dk.
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reporting of labor income on one hand and the wage level and the unem-
ployment rate on the other. To this aim we apply a matching model of a
well-dened labor market. A xed number of workers are in the labor mar-
ket, while rms enter this part of the economy, when it is protable to do so.
Firms post vacant positions, and they attempt to match with unemployed
workers which have been separated from previous employment. Once they
are matched, they bargain over both the o¢ cial wage and over the uno¢ cial
wage. The wage bargain will take into account tax rates as well as tax en-
forcement policy on the part of authorities. With wages set, labor market
tightness and therefore the rate of unemployment of workers are determined.
Higher taxes are normally associated with higher, or at least unchanged,
unemployment in labor markets. In our framework we nd, perhaps contrary
to expectations, that a higher tax rate actually tends to reduce unemploy-
ment. The reason for this positive e¤ect on employment is that increased
taxation will increase the value of tax evasion via under-reporting of income.
This in turn raises the value of employment relative to unemployment, as
evasion is open only to employed workers. The result is restrained wage de-
mands, such that the producer costs fall and more rms will open vacancies.
With the number of vacancies relative to the number of job seekers rising,
unemployment falls.
In one case, namely where unemployment benets are xed rather than
indexed to the wage, an increase in the payroll tax rate will have an ambigu-
ous e¤ect on unemployment. Wage moderation due to tax evasion opportu-
nities may in this case not be strong enough to counteract the direct e¤ect
on producer costs from higher payroll taxation.
Less frequent auditing of rms and workers or lower ne rates reduce un-
employment in our model. Since under-reporting of income again is available
only to employed workers, less frequent auditing or lower punishment of eva-
sion likewise increases the value of employment relative to unemployment.
The result is restrained wage demands, and more rms will nd it protable
to open vacancies. With the number of vacancies relative to the number of
job seekers rising, unemployment falls.
Thus, both higher tax rates and more lenient enforcement of taxes can in
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principle be used in our matching framework as instruments to increase the
incentives for employment and work. However, while we identify a mecha-
nism by which higher taxation is good for employment, we do not wish to
suggest that higher taxes constitute a free lunch. Within our model, con-
cealment costs limit the extent of tax evasion and thus the benecial e¤ect
on unemployment from higher taxes. And an extended framework would
naturally take into account that increased taxation may reduce incentives to
supply work hours and e¤ort (intensive margin), as well as to participate in
the labor market (extensive margin of labor supply). Also, the incentives to
acquire higher education may be reduced when taxes increase, especially if
the marginal tax rises with income.2 The potential negative e¤ects on em-
ployment along these margins are not accounted for in the paper, although
they most likely will be triggered by tax policy changes.
We rst derive our results in a basic version of the model. Then we go on
to show that extending the model by incorporating several formulations of
unemployment benets and taxation of company income does not alter our
main insights.
The literature on tax evasion has grown to become rather large.3 The
early theoretical analyses of tax evasion are provided by Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), where under-reporting of income by
an individual is modeled as a decision made under uncertainty. Subsequent
papers have enhanced the basic model of individual behavior by, for exam-
ple, incorporating endogenous labour supply decisions.4 Several theoretical
papers have recognized that the opportunities for tax evasion di¤er across
occupations; see for example Watson (1985), and Pestieau and Possen (1991).
Occupational choice in this literature is usually thought of as a choice between
self-employment, where under-reporting is possible, and regular employment,
2The connection between taxation and intensive, respectively extensive margins of labor
supply is discussed in Saez (2002); human capital accumulation and taxes is dealt with in
Nielsen and Sørensen (1997).
3See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Schneider and Eneste (2000) for two surveys of
tax avoidence and tax evasion.
4See for example Andersen (1977) and Sandmo (1981) for early contributions of en-
dogenous labour supply and under-reporting of income.
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where under-reporting is not an option. Pestieau and Possen (1991) argue
in such a framework that tax evasion should be allowed to some degree in
order to maintain a large stock of productive entrepreneurs. Also, general
equilibrium models with tax evasion have been developed; for an example
featuring commodity taxation see Cremer and Gahvari (1993).
Our paper di¤ers from these contributions in that we incorporate an im-
perfectly functioning labour market. This facilitates an analysis of how tax
and enforcement policies a¤ect wage setting and unemployment. As the pre-
vious research takes wages to be either exogenous or determined by market
clearing, such a framework will clearly not enable any examination of how
involuntary unemployment is a¤ected by tax and enforcement policies.
Moreover, one may note that the public nance approach to tax evasion
issues has switched focus from the individuals decision on the extent of
evasion of income tax (as in Allingham and Sandmo) towards a modeling
strategy where rms under-report their true prots, sales or wages paid.
This trend reects that the institutional setting has changed. When auditing
individual tax returns, tax authorities have access to reports on income paid
by companies to their employees; hence, it is nearly impossible for individuals
to misreport the wages and salaries paid to them.5 Our modeling strategy,
where the employer and the employee together agree on the amount of income
to report to the tax authorities, more closely corresponds to the institutional
setting in industrialized economies today. Further, our approach enables us
to relate under-reporting of labour income to labor market performance.
Recent years have seen some studies of underground activity in models
of involuntary unemployment; see Kolm and Larsen (2001, 2003), Cavalcanti
(2002), Boeri and Garibaldi (2002), and Fugazza and Jacques (2004). These
papers, however, do not focus on under-reporting of income; instead, they are
exclusively concerned with the activity in the underground economy. There
have also been some studies exploring the impact of taxation on involuntary
unemployment in the presence of home production. Holmlund (2002) and
Engström et al. (2005) show that increased taxation will induce fewer work
5Even capital income is becoming intrinsically more di¢ cult to under-report.
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hours and a higher level of involuntary unemployment when accounting for
home production in a model with search frictions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model and
examines how wages and unemployment are a¤ected by tax evasion as well
as by the tax and enforcement system. Section 3 considers some extensions
of the basic model to take account of unemployment benets and additional
taxes on rms. Section 4 considers the impact of tax and punishment policies,
when wages are set by unions. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model we employ to study the relation between tax evasion and enforce-
ment, wage formation, and unemployment is an equilibrium model of the
labor market. The labour market is characterized by trading frictions due to
costly and time-consuming matching of workers and rms.6
Firms le reports to the tax authorities regarding the amount of income
they have paid out to their employees. This o¢ cially reported income serves
as the basis for income taxes on workers and payroll taxes on rms. In addi-
tion, workers may earn income which is not reported to the tax authorities,
as workers and rms are able to evade taxes by agreeing on an amount of
income that goes unreported.
Tax authorities initially undertake a costless scanning of reported incomes
in the economy. Unless workers and rms have spent resources in order to
conceal unreported income, they will be immediately revealed as tax cheaters
by the authorities. In addition, tax authorities audit a fraction of rms in the
economy which are selected randomly among all rms that were not revealed
as tax cheaters by the initial scanning procedure. These audits are costly to
authorities, but do reveal the true compensation paid to workers.7
With a certain probability a worker-rm pair is targeted by an audit, after
which either party has to pay a ne. No rm will choose to under-report
6The core of our model corresponds to that in the basic model in Pissarides (2000).
7See Cremer and Gahvari (1993) among others for a similar assumption of an initial
scanning procedure and concealment costs.
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without at the same time spending resources to conceal this, as otherwise
they surely will be detected in the scanning procedure.
2.1 Matching
The economy consists of a large number of risk-neutral individuals.8 Without
loss of generality, we normalize this number to unity. Individuals are either
employed or unemployed. Employed workers are separated from their jobs
at the exogenous separation rate s. We assume that if a tax-evading worker-
rm pair is detected, they may nevertheless continue their relationship. It
is straightforward to show that the results of this paper are reinforced, if
we instead assume that the relationship is terminated upon detection of tax
evasion.
The matching process is captured by a concave, constant-returns-to-scale
matching function, H = h (v; u), where v is the number of vacancies supplied
by rms, and u is the number of unemployed workers searching for a job. As
the labour force is normalized to unity, the number of unemployed workers
and the number of vacancies are also the unemployment rate and the vacancy
rate, respectively. The rate at which an unemployed worker nds a job is
given byH=u = h (; 1) =  (), where  = v=u captures labour market tight-
ness. Firms ll vacancies at the rate H=v = h (1; 1=) = q (). Consequently,
we have  () = q (), where 0 () > 0 and q0 () < 0 . Higher labour
market tightness  increases workerschance of nding a job, but reduces the
likelihood of a rm nding a worker.
Equating the ows out of unemployment to the number of destroyed jobs
yields the steady state unemployment rate:
u =
s
s+  ()
; (1)
which depends positively on the separation rate and negatively on tightness.
8The assumption of risk neutrality confers simplicity and transparency upon the analy-
sis. We allow for risk aversion in a model version in section 4, where the impact on
qualitative conclusions is seen to be rather modest.
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2.2 Workers and Firms
Let E and U represent the expected discounted value of employment and
unemployment, respectively. The values of employment in a particular rm,
i, and unemployment can be written in the following form:
rEi = T + w
o
i (1  t) + wei (1  p)  C (wei )  s (Ei   U) ; (2)
rU = T +  (E   U) ; (3)
where wo is the o¢ cially reported wage, and we is the amount of a workers
remuneration which is not reported to the tax authorities. T is a lump sum
transfer received by all individuals; r the exogenous discount rate; t the pro-
portional income tax rate; p the probability of being detected as withholding
tax payments from the government; and  the proportion of evaded income
the worker has to pay as a ne if detected.9 C (we) captures concealment
costs of a worker related to withholding income from tax authorities, where
C 0 (we), C 00 (we) > 0, C (0) = C 0 (0) = 0: For simplicity, we assume that
unemployment benets are equal to zero initially; in section 3 we discuss the
case of positive unemployment benets.
Let J and V denote the expected present values of an occupied and
a vacant job, respectively. The asset equations of a specic occupied job,
referred to by the subscript i, and a vacant job, can be written as:
rJi = y   woi (1 + z)  wei (1 + p) G (wei )  s (Ji   V ) ; (4)
rV =  k + q (J   V ) ; (5)
where y is worker productivity, z denotes the payroll tax rate,  is the pro-
portion of the evaded wage the rm has to pay as a ne if detected, and k
is the cost of vacancy. G (we) captures the concealment costs facing a rm,
where G0 (we), G00 (we) > 0, G (0) = G0 (0) = 0. As will become clear, it is
of no importance for the results whether concealment costs are mainly car-
ried by the worker or by the rm. But it is important for the model solution
9As the setting of our model is in continous time, p is actually an intensity variable
rather than a true probability level. Nevertheless, we shall often refer to p as a probability,
and somewhat loosely one may think of p as the likelihood of detection within one time
unit.
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that concealment costs are convex.10 The existence and convexity of conceal-
ment costs are intuitive enough; there is little evidence against which these
assumptions can be checked, though.
2.3 Wage Determination
When a worker and a rm meet, they bargain over the o¢ cial wage, wo, as
well as over the uno¢ cial payment, we.
Formally we solve the wage bargaining problem by maximizing the Nash
Product with respect to woi and w
e
i . The Nash Product representing a par-
ticular match, i, is written as 
i =  ln (Ei   U)+ (1  ) ln (Ji   V ), where
 captures workersrelative bargaining power.
In a symmetric equilibrium, woi = w
o and wei = w
e, and under the as-
sumption of free entry V = 0,11 the rst order conditions can be written
as

1  
1
o
J = E   U; (6)

1  
1
e(we)
J = E   U; (7)
where o = (1 + z) = (1  t) and e(we) = (1 + p +G0 (we)) = (1  p   C 0 (we))
are the tax and punishment wedges. Solving for the bargained o¢ cial and
evaded wages, wo and we, from (6) and (7), we nd that we is determined
by,
o = e (we) : (8)
The amount of evaded income is chosen so that the tax and ne wedges
are equalized. We note from (8), using the denitions of the wedges, that
there is no evasion if the expected punishment rates are greater than or equal
to the tax rates, or more specically if (1 + p) = (1  p)  (1 + z) = (1  t).
With (1 + p) = (1  p) < (1 + z) = (1  t) ; on the other hand, it is always
10Strictly speaking, it su¢ ces that either C(:) or G(:) is a strictly convex function; the
other can be linear or even degenerate (equal to zero).
11An additional rm will, of course, nd itself in idle position to begin with. For entry
to be just (un)protable, V has to equal zero.
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optimal for the workers and the rms to agree on, at least some, evasion,
we > 0. We will concentrate on the case where there is an interior solution
with tax evasion, we > 0, and where it is not optimal for the two parties
to evade all of the income, wo > 0. This implies that we specically as-
sume (1 + p) = (1  p) < (1 + z) = (1  t) and that the concealment cost
functions are su¢ ciently convex.
The condition in (8) is intuitive, since if o > e the total surplus of the
match can be increased by raising the amount of evaded income for a given
level of total compensation. Analogously, it would be preferable for both
parties to reduce the amount of tax evasion, if o < e.
It follows from this discussion that the amount of evaded income is in our
framework a¤ected only by parameters in the tax and enforcement system
and not by labour market conditions or bargaining power. From this we can
conclude the straight forward implication that:
Proposition 1 Increased taxation, i.e. an increase in t or z, increases the
amount of under-reported income, whereas a stronger enforcement, i.e. an
increase in p, , or , reduces the amount of under-reported income.
Proof Di¤erentiate (8) with respect to we; z; t; p; ; .
Whereas labour market conditions and bargaining power do not have any
direct impact on the amount of under-reported income, they will, however,
a¤ect the total amount of compensation for work. Given the evaded income
which is determined in (8), we can derive the bargained per-period expected
producer costs facing an average rm using equation (6) or (7). This yields:
wo (1 + z) + we (1 + p) +G =  (y + k)  (1  )'; (9)
where ' = owe (1  p)  oC   we (1 + p) G  0. The parameter ' in
a sense measures the instantaneous surplus associated with tax evasion; it is
positive due to the properties of the concealment cost function.12
In the absence of tax evasion opportunities, the free entry condition dic-
tates that the gross wage, wo(1 + z), which then is total producer cost, will
12C 0 > C=we; G0 > G=we. Hence, ' = 0 only when there is no income tax evasion.
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equal (y + k). The sum (y + k) then stands for the surplus associated
with a successful match between a worker and a rm. The share  of the
surplus accrues to the worker. However, when it is possible to evade taxes,
doing it to the optimal extent reduces producer cost for a given tightness in
line with (9). Gross cost savings due to tax evasion amount to (1  )'.
We note that a change in the amount of unreported income, we, has no
e¤ect on expected producer costs for given tightness.13 Hence, a marginal
increase in unreported income reduces o¢ cial wage demands to such extent
that expected producer costs of rms are left una¤ected.
2.4 Tightness and the O¢ cial Wage
Labour market tightness is derived from equations (4) and (5), using the free
entry condition V = 0, and the expression for producer costs (9):
(r + s) k
q ()
= (1  ) y   k + (1  )'; (10)
where we recall that ' is pinned down by parameters from the tax and
punishment system as well as by the concealment cost functions; see the
denition of ' and (8). Thus (10) yields a unique solution for .
Finally, with the uno¢ cial wage component we and tightness  now de-
rived, the o¢ cial wage wo can easily be derived from the expression for pro-
ducer cost in (9). It is worth noting that in the absence of tax evasion op-
portunities, wo is simply given by wo = (y + k)=(1 + z); with tax evasion,
the o¢ cial wage will naturally be reduced.
2.5 Taxes, Enforcement, and Unemployment
We are now ready to draw conclusions about the relationship between tax
evasion and unemployment, and about the impact of tax and enforcement
policies on unemployment. Starting with the relationship between tax eva-
sion and unemployment we can conclude the following:
13Di¤erentiating the right hand side of (9) with respect to we yields (1  p  C 0)(o  
e(we)) which is zero for the optimal choice of we.
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Proposition 2 Let the expected punishment rates be lower than the tax rates
in the sense that o > e(0). Then unemployment will fall, if workers and
rms agree on tax evasion.
Proof With (1 + p) = (1  p) < (1 + z) = (1  t), rms and workers will
prot from tax evasion, i.e. we > 0 is agreed upon. No under-reporting of
income, we = 0, implies that ' = 0: From (10) it follows that  is larger
when we > 0 is agreed upon, since then ' > 0. And from (1) it follows that
unemployment falls with .
The intuition is straight-forward. As under-reporting of income is avail-
able only to employed workers, enabling tax evasion in e¤ect becomes an in-
strument to increase the incentive to work. The ability to evade taxes when
employed increases the value of employment relative to unemployment, in-
ducing wage moderation. Wage moderation in turn induces more rms to
post vacancies, lowering unemployment.
Clearly, workers become more keen on getting access to these tax evasion
opportunities the higher the tax rates are and the less severely tax evasion
is controlled and punished by the government. Thus, the higher are the tax
rates and the less strong is the government control of tax evasion, the more
willing are workers to accept lower wages in order to avoid unemployment.
That is, ' in (9) is larger the higher are t and z and the lower are p, , and
.
The government can, of course, not directly control the amount of under-
reporting of income by rms and workers. But it can a¤ect how attractive
tax evasion appears by its choice of tax rates and the parameters of the
enforcement system. We conclude:
Proposition 3 In case workers and rms evade taxes, we > 0, increased
taxation, i.e. an increase in t or z, reduces unemployment whereas a stronger
enforcement, i.e. an increase in p, , or , raises unemployment.
Proof Di¤erentiating (10) yields @=@x1 < 0; and @=@x2 > 0, x1 =
p; ; ; x2 = t; z: Di¤erentiating (1) yields @u=@x1 > 0; and @u=@x2 < 0,
x1 = p; ; ; x2 = t; z:
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We thus nd, perhaps contrary to expectations, that higher tax rates
actually reduce unemployment. The reason is that an increased tax rate will
increase the value of evasion. This in turn raises the value of employment
relative to unemployment as evasion is open only to employed workers; wage
demands are restrained and unemployment reduced.
This mechanism becomes even more clear, if we consider the impact
of taxes on unemployment in the absence of opportunities to under-report
labour income. In the absence of under-reporting of income, this model col-
lapses to the basic Pissarides model (Pissarides (2000)), where an increase
in, for example, the payroll tax rate induces wage adjustment which leaves
producer costs and unemployment una¤ected in equilibrium. When the pay-
roll tax rate increases, rms will open less vacancies as expected prots fall.
However, as less vacancies are opened, it becomes more di¢ cult to get a
new job in case of job loss, and in order to avoid unemployment wages are
restrained. In case of no unemployment benets or of benets indexed to the
consumer wage, wages are restrained to such extent that the producer wage
and thus tightness and unemployment is una¤ected in equilibrium.
These mechanisms are also present if we allow for under-reporting of
labour income. However, in the presence of under-reporting there is an addi-
tional e¤ect which induces wage demands to fall further. When the payroll
tax rate increases, it becomes more valuable to under-report income, and
thus more valuable to be employed and have access to these tax evasion op-
portunities. Accordingly, workers become more willing to accept lower wages
in order to avoid unemployment.
For analogous reasons, punishing tax evasion through more frequent au-
diting or higher nes reduces the attractiveness of tax evasion. As a conse-
quence, wage demands increase, and less rms will open vacancies; unemploy-
ment rises. Workers are simply less willing to accept low wages as opposed
to unemployment. Conversely, reducing the punishment of tax evasion can
actually function as an instrument to increase the incentive to work, restrain
wage demands and reduce unemployment.
Introducing the government budget restriction enables us to take a closer
look at the content of proposition 2. The government budget restriction in
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per-capita form is given by:
T = (1  u) [wo (t+ z) + wep (+ )]  F (p(1  u)) : (11)
The right hand side has the net revenue of the government, i.e. the excess of
revenue from taxation and auditing over the cost of auditing, F (p(1  u)).
The cost of auditing is written as a function of the number of rm-worker
relationships inspected. On the left hand side is the resulting lump-sum
transfer T paid to all workers.
Appropriate adjustments in T clearly enable the policy changes in propo-
sition 2 to be fully nanced. Alternatively, it is possible to keep T unchanged
in a reform by combining a reduced audit rate or reduced nes with higher
tax rates; such a reform leads to a double reduction in unemployment.14
2.6 An Alternative Formulation of Fines
Our remark above that one would expect the nes  and  to be balanced
against punishment of other crimes suggests an alternative formulation of
these nes. In practice, nes often consist of both the tax that the worker
or employer attempted to evade in the rst instance, and a genuine ne
expressed as a certain percentage of the tax.15
Hence, a possible alternative formulation of ne parameters could be
 = at;  = az
where a would be somewhere between, say, 1 and 3, so that both the original
tax and a ne proportional to the tax would be included in the ne payment
to authorities. The parameter a would be regarded as xed, whereas the ne
14Taking as given that the economy is located on the positively sloped side of the La¤er
curve in the sence that an increase in t, z, ,  or p does generate higher revenue.
15Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 820) write, for example, that civil penalties typically are
applied at a rate of 20 percent of the portion of the underpayment of tax resulting from
a specied misconduct; in cases of fraud, a civil penalty may be applied at a rate of 75
percent. In Denmark, tax evasion or cheating is often punished with a payment equal to
200 pct. or more of the tax that originally was avoided, the relevant percentage being
determined by the amount of tax evaded.
14
payment contrary to our formulation above would vary with changes in
tax rates. Relative to the comparative statics analysis above, there would
be no change in the analysis of altering the auditing probability, p. But a
change in either of the two taxes t or z would give rise to additional terms,
as payments upon detection would change in line with the relevant tax rate.
It turns out that as long as the expression 1   pa   C=we can be taken
as positive, the qualitative results concerning the e¤ects of tax increases on
market tightness and unemployment will be the same as above. While a
positive sign of the expression seems natural, it is not a necessity, though.
In the next section we shall revert to the original and simpler formulation
of nes.
3 Extensions
In this section we look at the implications of selected modications and ex-
tensions to our framework. Specically, we consider the existence of positive
unemployment benets and other taxes on rms such as the corporate income
tax.
3.1 Positive Benets
We rst explore the consequences of positive unemployment benets. The
basic model featured only a common transfer to both employed and unem-
ployed individuals and no special benets to the unemployed. Introducing
unemployment benets implies facing questions as to how these benets are
determined, and a couple of options are explored below.
The value function for an unemployed worker is now written:
rUi = T +B +  (Ei   Ui) ; (12)
where B denotes the after-tax benet received when unemployed. The value
functions for employed workers and rms are still given by (2), (4), and (5).
Accounting for benets will not inuence the rst order conditions deter-
mining wages, (6) and (7), with the exception that the term E  U becomes
15
E U = 1
r+s+
(wo (1  t) + we (1  p)  C (we) B). Hence, (8) still pins
down the size of unreported income as given by concealment cost functions
and the tax and punishment system. Changes in the unemployment benet
system will thus not inuence the amount of unreported income.
We explore two natural candidates for the denition of unemployment
benets. First, we assume that the (tax-exempt) benet is indexed to the
average net (o¢ cial) wage, i.e., B = wo(1  t), implying an o¢ cial constant
replacement rate. Second, we assume that the pre-tax unemployment benet
is xed at B, so that the after-tax benet can be written B = B (1  t).16
Constant replacement rate
Proceeding with the rst denition we can derive the per-period expected
producer costs from (6), keeping in mind that (8) determines the unreported
income, we. This yields:
wo (1 + z)+we (1 + p)+G =
1
1   (1  ) [ (y + k)  (1  )'
0] ; (13)
where '0 = owe (1  p) oC  (1  ) (we (1 + p) +G)  0. Comparing
(13) with (9) allows to clarify how positive benets indexed to the (o¢ cial)
wage a¤ects producer costs and thereby unemployment.
First, we note that the square brackets on the right hand side is multiplied
by 1= (1   (1  )). This has no impact on the qualitative results derived
from the basic model.17 Secondly, and more interesting, we note that 
enters the expression for '0. This implies, in contrast to the basic model,
that the expected producer costs are a¤ected by changes in the amount of
unreported income, we. Specically, we have @'
0
@we
= o (1  p   C 0)  > 0
for  > 0. In the basic model with no unemployment benets, i.e.,  = 0,
16Note that in both cases unemployment benets are realistically assumed to be sub-
ject to personal income taxation. Alternatively, unemployment benets might be exempt
from tax.
17This term only amplies the e¤ect from comparative statics as 1= (1   (1  )) > 1.
An increase in for example y increases wage demands as the workers want to reap a fraction
of the productivity increase. With benets indexed to the average (o¢ cial) wage, they rise
with the higher o¢ cial wages. As benets increase, o¢ cial wage demands are increased
further. Thus, the e¤ect on wages is amplied. Analogous reasoning holds for a change in
p, , or  and t or z.
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an increase in unreported income reduced o¢ cial wage demands such that
expected producer costs were una¤ected. With positive benets,  > 0, an
increase in unreported income will induce o¢ cial wage demands to fall to
such an extent that total expected producer costs actually fall. The reason
is that the reduced o¢ cial wage demands also lower unemployment benets.
This reduction in unemployment benets induces wage moderation which
causes total expected producer costs to fall.
We know from proposition 3 that unemployment falls following an in-
crease in t or z or a reduction in p, , or . In the presence of positive unem-
ployments benets, unemployment falls for a second reason, since it becomes
optimal to under-report more income. As this causes unemployment benets
to fall, in turn inducing wage moderation, unemployment drops. Accordingly,
benets indexed to the (o¢ cial) wage reinforces the e¤ect on unemployment
of a change in p,  or  and z or t. This insight is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 4 With unemployment benets indexed to the o¢ cial wage,
B = wo (1  t), and workers and rms evading taxes, we > 0, an increase
in t or z, or a reduction in p, , or , will induce a supplementary wage mod-
erating e¤ect, as unemployment benets fall when workers and rms increase
the uno¢ cial wage. This additional mechanism will also work to reduce un-
employment.
Proof Di¤erentiating (13) with respect to the producer costs and we
yields @ (wo (1 + z) + we (1 + p) +G) =@we < 0. Di¤erentiating (10) yields
@=@we > 0. Finally, di¤erentiating (1) yields @u=@we = @u=@@=@we < 0:
Fixed pre-tax benets
Now let benets be xed pre-tax, i.e., B = B (1  t) ; where B is the pre-
tax unemployment benet. The per-period expected producer costs derived
from (6) then take the form:
wo (1 + z) + we (1 + p) +G =  (y + k) + (1  ) B (1 + z)  (1  )';
(14)
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where again we is determined in (8). This expression reveals that changes in
,  and t will work through the same channels as in the basic model.
However, there will be a direct e¤ect on producer costs of a change in
the payroll tax rate, z. An increase in z will have a direct positive e¤ect
on producer costs, which goes in the opposite direction to the e¤ect of z
through ' (see proposition 2). This direct positive e¤ect on producer costs
is the standard e¤ect found in models of equilibrium unemployment when
benets are not indexed to the wage (see Pissarides (1998)).18 This implies
that an increase in z will have an ambiguous e¤ect on unemployment in
contrast to the basic model (where B = 0) and in contrast to the model
where benets are indexed to the o¢ cial wage (B = wo (1  t)).
Proposition 2 holds for the same reason as in the basic model, when pos-
itive unemployment benets are accounted for (irrespective of the denition
of unemployment benets).
3.2 Including Firm Income Taxes
Until now, we have exclusively focused on taxation of labor income in a
setting in which both rms and workers are liable to pay tax on labor. In
reality, of course, rms pay other taxes. Most of the other taxes paid and
subsidies received by rms we can safely ignore here, but there is one good
reason for taking a brief look at the taxation of rm income (such as by
means of the corporate income tax). This is the fact that when a rm agrees
18It is interesting to note the incidence of the payroll tax and how it varies with the
denition of unemployment benets: When there is an increase in the payroll tax, the
producer wage initially increases. However, as rms will open less vacancies when wage
costs are higher, tightness falls. This reduction in tightness will induce wage moderation,
which in turn reduces wage costs and induces tightness to increase again. Thus the burden
of the payroll tax is also carried by the worker. When benets are indexed to wages,
benets will fall as wages are moderated. And as benets fall, wages are moderated further.
In fact, with benets being indexed to the wage, the worker will carry the full burden of
the tax, leaving producer cost una¤ected in equilibrium. However, in the absence of this
indexation of benets, the burden of the payroll tax rate is shared by both the worker and
the rm, which causes producer costs to increase in this case.
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with a worker to have part of the remuneration of labor be paid out as
uno¢ cial wage, then this part cannot be deducted from the rms revenue
in computing its taxable income. So while the rm may gain from avoiding
pay-roll taxation, ceteris paribus it will lose by experiencing an increase in
its taxable income, leading to a higher income tax payment. This e¤ect can
be avoided, if in addition to evasion of pay-roll taxation the rm can also
evade income taxation through under-reporting of revenues.
Against these observations we now extend our framework to incorporate
income taxation of the rm and a mechanism for evading this tax, too. To
begin with, only the rm side of the model is a¤ected.
We use the following notation. y still denotes true revenue of the rm,
while yo is the o¢ cial part of it, as appearing on the rms tax return.
The company income tax is levied at the rate x, and pay-roll tax as well
as the o¢ cial wage can be deducted from the income tax base. Declared
taxable income thus is yo   wo(1 + z), while true taxable income instead is
y   wo(1 + z)  we(1 + z).
The di¤erence between true and o¢ cial taxable income hence is y  yo 
we(1+z). From this expression we easily see that paying out uno¢ cial income
directly entails an increase in taxable income of we(1 + z), and that a lower
value of o¢ cial (yo) than true (y) revenue brings down taxable income.
We assume that the rm has an opportunity, coming at a cost, to evade
income tax, and that such evasion is detected at the same probability as
evasion of pay-roll or labor income taxation. In other words, if and only if
a rm-worker pair is inspected will authorities learn about both company
income and wage tax evasion. We also assume that nes as well as costs
of evasion are a function of evaded income, or y   yo   we(1 + z). That is,
given that the rm already evades pay-roll tax and pays out an uno¢ cial
wage component, it can for free reduce its o¢ cial revenue by the amount
we(1 + z)(i.e. without incurring nes or costs of evasion).19
19An example may clarify this. Suppose the rm pays 40 in o¢ cial wage and likewise
40 in uno¢ cial wage. The payroll tax is 25 pct. With these numbers, paying 40 in
uno¢ cial rather than o¢ cial wage implies that the deduction for wages in the rms
income statement is reduced by 50. If its true revenue is 300, then declaring an o¢ cial
19
It is clear by now that the rms decision as to o¢ cial revenue hinges
on the size of the uno¢ cial wage it pays to the worker. Vice versa, the
willingness of the rm to pay out uno¢ cial and o¢ cial wage components
might depend on the size of the o¢ cial revenue on its income tax return. How
these interdependencies work themselves out is determined by the timing of
the decisions on the part of the rm. Here, we shall assume that the rm
rst engages in bargaining with its worker about o¢ cial and uno¢ cial wage
components, and second, it lls out its income tax return.
At the point where the rm computes its o¢ cial taxable income, wo and
we are thus already given. With a ne of  per unit of income evaded from
tax and a cost of evasion of H(y   yo   we(1 + z)) where H 0 (:), H 00 (:) > 0
(for positive arguments of the functions), H (0) = H 0 (0) = 0, the income of
the rm net of taxes, expected nes, and costs of evasion can be written as
[y   (wo + we)(1 + z)](1  x) + wez   pwe  G(we)
+ x(y   yo   we(1 + z))  p(y   yo   we(1 + z)) H(y   yo   we(1 + z)):
The rst term denotes its true net of tax income in the absence of all tax
evasion. The next three terms stands for tax savings, expected nes and
costs of evasion associated with pay-roll tax, while the nal three terms are
the parallel items for the company income tax.
Deciding on the optimum amount of income tax evasion is then tanta-
mount to nding the yo which maximizes the net value of the latter three
terms. The rst order condition yields
x = p +H 0(y   yo   we(1 + z)): (15)
The marginal tax saving has to equal the sum of the marginal expected ne
and the marginal cost of evasion. An interior solution with y yo we(1+z) >
0 is possible with x > p, which we assume holds. This expression nails down
revenue of 250 will imply no evasion of income tax, as the o¢ cial income of 200 (250-50)
corresponds to true income (300-100). On the other hand, if the rm only declares a
revenue of 200, then evaded income amounts to 50, and if detected the rm will have to
pay a ne accordingly.
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the amount of income tax evasion as
y   yo   we(1 + z) = (H 0) 1(x  p) (16)
or the amount of o¢ cial revenue as in,
yo = y   we(1 + z)  (H 0) 1(x  p): (17)
The greater is the uno¢ cial wage or the pay-roll tax, the lower is declared
revenue. Moreover, the higher is the income tax rate, and the lower is the
likelihood of detection, the lower is declared revenue.
The most important relationship here is the rst one, i.e. between the un-
o¢ cial wage component and declared income and thus net income. Utilizing
income tax evasion opportunities and properly compensating for uno¢ cial
wage payments in declared income, the rm on net reduces its taxable in-
come by
x(y   yo   we(1 + z))  p(y   yo   we(1 + z)) H(y   yo   we(1 + z))
= (x  p)(H 0) 1(x  p) H((H 0) 1(x  p))  K(x  p):
In this expression, K(x p) stands for the net gains from exploiting income
tax evasion opportunities. The term K(x   p) is the income tax evasion
counterpart to the wage tax evasion term ' in the basic model, and K(:) is
positive due to the properties of the concealment cost function.20
With this information we can now turn to wage bargaining. The ow
equation for an active rm is
rJi = [y (woi+wei )(1+z)](1 x)+wei z pwei G(wei )+K(x p) s(Ji V ):
(18)
Compared to the basic model, the equation takes into account that the rm
pays income tax, but can prot from evasion of same tax. The ow equation
for vacancies is still (5).
20H 0 > H=(y yo we (1 + z)). K(x p) = 0 only when there is no income tax evasion,
i.e., when x  p  0.
21
Going through the same steps as in section 2 we can derive new versions
of equations (6) and (7) which nail down the o¢ cial and the uno¢ cial wage.
We nd that we is implicitly determined by:
(1 + z)(1  x)
1  t =
1  x(1 + z) + p +G0(we)
1  p   C 0(we) (19)
where the left hand side is the slightly modied o¢ cial tax wedge, ~o, and
the right hand side is the slightly modied punishment wedge, ~e. The
numerators on both sides of the equation contain the common term  x(1+z)
featuring the company income tax rate x. The interesting question is whether
taking account of rm income taxation will raise or lower the amount of wage
which is not declared to authorities. It turns out that both directions are
possibilities. To see this, partially di¤erentiate ~o   ~e = 0 in (19) with
respect to x and we. The result is
Proposition 5 The uno¢ cial wage component we increases (decreases, stays
constant) upon the introduction of the company income tax, if z p G0(we)
in the no-company-tax situation is positive (negative, zero).
Proof Di¤erentiate (19) with respect to we and x:
Going back to section 2, the condition in the proposition is equivalent to
the numerator of o being greater than the numerator of e(we). (The two tax
factors have to be equal, but their numerators can have any relationship.) In
a loose sense, z p G0(we) being positive implies that it is relatively more
attractive for the rm than for the worker to evade labor tax. Accordingly,
if the rm is a more e¤ective tax evader than is the worker, then introducing
company income taxation leads to more extensive evasion of wage taxation.
The proposition connects wage tax evasion to company taxation. Simi-
larly, it is possible to relate total labor costs, tightness and unemployment
to the company tax and also to the opportunities to evade this tax. Similar
steps as those leading to equation (9) can be used to derive total producer
costs.21 Using the expression for total producer costs and (18) and (5) under
21Total producer costs are given by wo (1 + z) (1  x) + we (1 + p  (1 + z)x) + G =
 (y(1  x) + k) + K(x  p)  (1  ) ~':
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the assumption of free entry, we can write the equation determining tightness
as
(r + s) k
q ()
= (1  ) y (1  x)  k + (1  ) (K(x  p) + ~') : (20)
where ~' = ~owe (1  p)  ~oC we (1 + p) G+we (1 + z)x  0. ~' is pos-
itive due to the properties of the concealment cost functions and @ ~'=@we = 0
due to the envelope property as discussed in the basic model. Unemployment
is still given by (1).
The company income tax a¤ects tightness and thereby unemployment in
three di¤erent ways. First, as a direct consequence of the tax, rm prots
fall which reduces tightness and increases unemployment. Second, increased
taxation of company income increases the net gain of income tax evasion
which instead induces more rms to enter the market. This tends to increase
tightness and reduce unemployment. However, obviously the former e¤ect
must dominate this latter e¤ect, as the gain from evading income tax can
never exceed taxation of the rms revenue. Third, a higher income tax has
a minor e¤ect on the net gains that can be made from evading wage tax. An
increase in x will lower these gains and lead to higher wage demands and
lower employment, i¤ we(p   t) + C < 0 which is likely to hold.22 In any
case, the total e¤ect on tightness and employment of a rise in the company
income tax is clear:
Proposition 6 An increase in the company income tax rate reduces tightness
and increases unemployment.
Proof Di¤erentiating (20) yields @=@x < 0: Di¤erentiating (1) yields
@u=@x > 0:
An alternative to the analysis above is to assume that when the rm
is inactive, it can deduct the vacancy cost k from the income tax, or rather
enjoy a tax rebate of xk. To take this into account we write the ow equation
for an inactive rm as rV =  k (1  x) + q (J   V ). Two additional e¤ects
22This is the condition for the individual worker to directly benet from concealing the
uno¢ cial part of her wage income rather than reveal it.
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on tightness and unemployment of a higher income tax rate emerge. First, an
increase in x reduces the per period vacancy cost which induces more rms
to enter. Second, an increase in x reduces the surplus of the match due to
saved vacancy costs. This causes wage moderation and more rms to enter.
Both e¤ects increase tightness and reduce unemployment, thus working in
the opposite direction to the e¤ects in proposition 6.
It is straightforward to verify that propositions 1 to 3 hold even in the
presence of a company income tax. This can be shown proceeding along the
lines of the proofs of the three propositions. Accordingly, lighter taxation of
labor or stronger tax enforcement will raise unemployment, even if rms also
pay tax on company income. Interestingly, an increase in p will now have an
additional negative impact on tightness and employment. The reason is that
an increase in p also punishes rms by making company income tax evasion
less attractive. Recall that any income tax evasion by rms is detected along
with the evasion of labour taxes. This will have a direct negative e¤ect on
the attractiveness for rms to enter which consequently reduces tightness and
increases unemployment.
4 Wage Setting by Unions
When considering the e¤ects of tax policies in general, it usually makes little
or no di¤erence for results whether the model in focus is a matching model,
or some type of union model.23 To investigate if this holds true also in the
presence of under-reporting of income, this section explores the impact of tax
and enforcement policies in a static model where wages are set by unions.
This can be viewed as a robustness check, although one may argue that it is of
less practical relevance to have unions, as opposed to individuals, accounting
for under-reporting of income in wage setting.
In the rst stage, unions set wages. However, unions will take into con-
sideration that rms in the second stage will determine how many workers
23See for example Pissarides (1998), who investigates the impact of changes in the
average tax rate and the degree of tax progression in a number of models featuring unem-
ployment in equilibrium.
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to hire. The problem is solved through backwards induction.
Firms decide on the number of workers to hire so as to maximize their
prot taking wages as predetermined, i.e., they solve MaxN  = N  
wo (1 + z)N we (1 + p)N NG (we), where, for simplicity, the production
technology is captured by a Cobb Douglas function, the price is normalized
to unity, and the individual index is dropped. From the rst order condition,
we can derive the rms demand for labor as:
N =

wo (1 + z) + we (1 + p) +G

  1
1 
; (21)
"o =   @N
@wo
wo
N
=
1
1  
wo (1 + z)
wo (1 + z) + we (1 + p) +G
; (22)
"e =   @N
@we
we
N
=
1
1  
we (1 + p +G0)
wo (1 + z) + we (1 + p) +G
: (23)
Unions choose the compensation so to maximize their utilitarian objective
function. They face a trade-o¤ in that a higher compensation is welfare
enhancing for the employed members, but a higher compensation will, at the
same time, render more members unemployed which reduces the well-being
of those members. As all workers are assumed to receive unemployment
benets B in case of unemployment, the union objective can be written
 = N (wo (1  t) + we (1  p)  C (we) B). The o¢ cial and the evaded
wage are set so as to maximize the unions objective function subject to rms
subsequent determination of employment. The rst order conditions can be
rewritten as:
"o (wo (1  t) + we (1  p)  C (we) B (1  t))  wo (1  t) = 0;
(24)
"e (wo (1  t) + we (1  p)  C (we) B (1  t))  we (1  p   C 0) = 0:
(25)
Using the rst order conditions in (24) and (25) as well as the expressions
for the labor demand elasticities, "o and "e, in (22) and (23), the following
equation will again determine the evaded wage:
o =
(1 + z)
(1  t) =
(1 + p +G0 (we))
(1  p   C 0 (we)) = 
e (we) : (26)
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Producer wage costs can then be derived from (24) or (25):
wo (1 + z) + we (1 + p) +G =
1


B (1 + z)  ' ; (27)
where again ' is given by the same expressions as in the basic matching
model, i.e., ' = owe (1  p)  oC   we (1 + p) G  0. It is clear from
(27), that the mechanisms generated by tax evasion opportunities as well as
the e¤ects on producer costs of changes in the tax and punishment policies,
z; t; p;  and , will be qualitatively the same as in the matching model (see
equation (14)). And as employment is determined residually by (21), when
unions set wages, the impact will be analogous also for employment (taking
the mass of rms to be normalized to unity).
Risk aversion
The relatively more simple framework of the static union model, provides
an opportunity to relax the assumption of risk neutrality. With risk aversion
the union objective function may take the form:
i = N ((w
o (1  t) + we (1  p)  C (we))  B) ;
where  < 1 allows for risk aversion. Unions choosing the o¢ cial and the
uno¢ cial wage in an optimizing way again nd it optimal to under-report
income such that o = e (we). The producer wage costs are in the case of
risk aversion given by:
wo (1 + z)+we (1 + p)+G =
1
1  (1  )
"  
B (1  t) o
[wo (1  t) + we (1  p)  C] 1   '
#
:
(28)
Note from (28) that in the presence of risk aversion, the marginal utility
of consumption for employed workers enters in the denominator of the term
in the parentheses on the right hand side.
When for example the payroll tax rate increases, there is a shift in the
composition of compensation towards more unreported compensation (see
o = e (we) and proposition 1). However, total compensation also tends to
fall, as the burden of the payroll tax levied on rms is pushed onto workers.
We concluded in proposition 3 that this wage moderating e¤ect was strong
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enough to make producer wage costs fall. However, when unemployment
benets are taxed but xed, rather than indexed to the wage, there was
a counteracting e¤ect which tended to weaken wage moderation. In the
presence of risk aversion there is an additional e¤ect: As the compensation
from work falls with an increase in the payroll tax rate, the marginal utility
of consumption when employed increases, which tends to induce further wage
moderation.
5 Conclusions
Much of tax evasion in modern-day industrialized countries, especially within
certain service sectors, takes the form of rms and workers agreeing on under-
reporting the wages paid to workers. This way, rms save on payroll taxes
and workers save on personal income taxes. Suspecting such under-reporting
of wages, tax authorities may decide to audit rms closely, and if they detect
irregularities they can impose nes on at least one of the two parties. The
interesting question then is how the scope for tax evasion through under-
reporting of wages will a¤ect the remuneration of workers, producer costs,
and the performance of the labor market.
In this paper we have set up a labor market model exactly to asses the
e¤ects of tax rates and enforcement of taxation on the level of wages and
the rate of unemployment. We found that tighter auditing on the part of
authorities would lead to higher producer costs and more unemployment.
Conversely, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we at the same time derived
that higher wage taxes (on payrolls or personal incomes) would lead to lower
unemployment. The main mechanism responsible for this result is that higher
tax rates make tax evasion more attractive and rewarding. And as evasion
is available only to employed workers, higher wage taxes increases the value
of having a job which restrains wage demands.
Our examination of several extensions of the basic model revealed that the
main results concerning the relationship between tax rates and enforcement
parameters on one hand and unemployment and labor costs on the other, by
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and large carry over to di¤erent settings, where unemployed workers receive
unemployment benets, or where rms in addition to payroll taxes pay reg-
ular income taxes. In addition, the results hold in a model version, where
unions set wages anticipating that rms residually decide on employment.
The framework we have set up can be fruitfully applied to study further
questions related to taxation and enforcement of taxation. One interesting
issue, already touched upon in the paper, is the incidence of taxes, enforce-
ment, and social security transfers in the labor market, i.e. the degree to
which the worker (rm) carries the burden of higher taxes, more stringent
enforcement, or cuts in unemployment insurance. Another topic is the wel-
fare consequences of enhanced use of tax and enforcement instruments. A
study of this latter topic will be complicated by the fact that ine¢ ciencies
related to resource use in inspections or behavioral distortions may interfere
with search ine¢ ciencies inherent in a labor market characterized by frictions
in the matching of workers and rms.
In addition, there are a number of relevant margins that should be ac-
counted for in a more comprehensive analysis of the e¤ects of tax and enforce-
ment policies on labor market performance. In the basic model we showed
that increased taxation is good for employment. However, we ignored that
tax and enforcement policies may have negative e¤ects on the individuals
choice of work hours and labor force participation. Also, the acquisition
of higher education is likely to be negatively a¤ected by higher tax rates,
at least when taxation is progressive. These issues have to be relegated to
future work, though.
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